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• Ranking influential spreaders is significant for many real problems.
• Weighted LeaderRank outperforms degree centralities.
• Weighted LeaderRank provides more accurate and robust solution than LeaderRank.
Identifying influential spreaders is crucial for understanding and controlling spreading pro-
cesses on social networks. Via assigning degree-dependent weights onto links associated
with the ground node, we proposed a variant to a recent ranking algorithm named Leader-
Rank (Lü et al., 2011). According to the simulations on the standard SIRmodel, theweighted
LeaderRank performs better than LeaderRank in three aspects: (i) the ability to find out
more influential spreaders; (ii) the higher tolerance to noisy data; and (iii) the higher ro-
bustness to intentional attacks.
1. Introduction
The spreading processes of epidemic and information attract increasing attention in complex network studies [1], and
researchers tried to find the reason why information spread so quickly [2,3] as well as how to decelerate the spreading [4].
Among many ingredients for quick and wide spreading, influential spreaders play a major role [5–7]. Accordingly, immu-
nization on large-degree nodes (they are usually considered to be more influential) is a highly efficient method to control
epidemic spreading [8–10]. It is of great theoretical and practical significance to identify influential spreaders in networks,
and similar methods can be applied in ranking scientists [11,12], publications [12], athletes [13] and finding influential
directors [14].
How to identify influential spreaders effectively and efficiently is a big challenge up to now. A number of centrality indices
have been proposed to address this problem, such as degree centrality, closeness centrality [15], betweenness centrality [16],
and eigenvector centrality [17]. Degree centrality is a straightforward and efficient metric but less relevant, because a node
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail address: zhutou@ustc.edu (T. Zhou).
1
Published in 3K\VLFD$6WDWLVWLFDO0HFKDQLFVDQGLWV$SSOLFDWLRQV
±
which should be cited to refer to this work.
ht
tp
://
do
c.
re
ro
.c
h
having a few highly influential neighbors may be more influential than a node having a larger number of less influential
neighbors, while the computation of closeness, betweenness and eigenvector centrality is highly time-consuming and thus
usually not feasible for large-scale networks. Somemethods have already been proposed in the literature to identify influen-
tial spreaders in an effective and efficient way [18–26]. Kitsak et al. [19] proposed a coarse-grained method by using k-core
decomposition to quantify a node’s influence based on the assumption that nodes in the same shell have similar influence
and nodes in higher-level shells are likely to infectmore nodes. Zeng et al. [25] found several limitations of the abovemethod
and proposed a mixed degree decomposition method, as an improved version of the traditional k-core decomposition. Liu
et al. [26] argued that nodes in the same shell may indeed have considerably different spreadabilities, and proposed an im-
provedmethod that can properly rank nodes in the same shell. Chen et al. [23] devised a semi-local index by considering the
next nearest neighborhood, which performs as good as global indices while has much lower computational complexity, and
thus obtains a good trade-off on effectiveness and efficiency. In addition, Chen algorithm [23] can well identify influential
nodes in a hierarchical tree that cannot be managed by the k-core decomposition. Furthermore, Chen et al. [24] proposed
an improved index for directed networks, which accounts for the effects of local clustering and shows better performance.
Recently, Lü et al. [27] proposed the LeaderRank algorithm to identify influential spreaders in directed networks, which
is a simple variant of PageRank [28], namely a so-called ground node connected with every other node by a bidirectional
link is introduced into the original network, and then the standard random walk process is applied to dig out influential
spreaders. Thanks to this simple change, LeaderRank outperforms PageRank in several aspects: (i) LeaderRank converges
faster since the network is strongly connectedwith diameter being only 2; (ii) the influential nodes identified by LeaderRank
can spread information faster and wider than those by PageRank; (iii) LeaderRank has higher tolerance to noisy data, and
(iv) LeaderRank has higher robustness to intentional attacks. In this paper, we further improve the LeaderRank algorithm
by allowing nodes with more fans get more scores from the ground node, that is, replacing the standard random walk
by a biased random walk. Experiments on three real social networks (i.e., Delicious, Epinions and Slashdot) show that the
weighted LeaderRank can considerably improve the performance of the original LeaderRank.
2. Algorithm
Given a network consisting of N nodes andM directed links, a ground node connected with every node by a bidirectional
link is added. Then, the network becomes strongly connected and consists of N + 1 nodes andM + 2N links (a bidirectional
link is counted as two links with inverse directions). LeaderRank directly applies the standard random walk process to
determine the score of every node. Accordingly, if the score of node i at time step t is si(t), the dynamics can be described
by an iterative process as
si(t + 1) =
N+1∑
j=1
aji
koutj
sj(t), (1)
where aji is the element of the corresponding (N + 1)-dimensional adjacency matrix, which equals 1 if there is a directed
link from j to i and 0 otherwise, and koutj is the out-degree of node j. The process starts with the initialization where all node
scores are 1 and will soon converge to a unique steady state denoted as s∞i (i = 1, 2, . . . ,N,N + 1). LeaderRank ranks all
nodes according to s∞i , and the nodes with larger final scores are considered to be more influential in spreading.
Aswe havementioned in the Introduction, LeaderRank outperforms PageRank in several aspects. In this paper, we intend
to further improve LeaderRank by introducing a weighted mechanism. Considering a social network where a user i is called
a fan of user j if there is a directed link from i to j, namely i could receive information from j and thus jwill receive scores from
i (if a node’s fans are of high influence, this node will be highly influential as well). Obviously, the number of fans (i.e., in-
degree) is an important local indicator for a user’s influence in spreading. Therefore, based on LeaderRank, we allow nodes
with different in-degrees get different scores from the ground node (other possible weighting schemes will be discussed
in the last section). Accordingly, the network is described by an (N + 1)-dimensional weighted adjacency matrix W . As
illustrated in Fig. 1: (i) if aij = 0, then wij = 0; (ii) for any normal node i and the ground node g, wgi = (kini )α and wig = 1,
whereα is a free parameter; (iii) for all other cases,wij = 1. After determining theweight of every link, the dynamics follows
a biased random walk [29], namely the score from node j to node i is proportional to the weight wji:
si(t + 1) =
N+1∑
j=1
wji
N+1∑
l=1
wjl
sj(t). (2)
Same to LeaderRank, we use final scores in the steady state to quantify nodes’ influences.
3. Results
3.1. Data
To validate the effectiveness of the weighted LeaderRank algorithm, we test it on three real social networks: (i) Deli-
cious [30]—a social bookmarkingweb site,where users could subscribe to leaders’ collections as their sources of information;
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Fig. 1. Illustration of the weighted LeaderRank algorithm, where a user having more fans would get more score from the ground node g . The weight of
the directed link from the ground node to node i is wgi = (kini )α , and other weights are all one.
Table 1
Basic statistics of three real networks, including the number of nodes N , the
number of linksM and the average degree 〈k〉 = 〈kin〉 = 〈kout〉.
Networks N M 〈k〉
Delicious 582377 1686131 2.90
Epinions 75879 508837 6.71
Slashdot 77360 828161 10.71
(ii) Epinions [31]—a product review web site, where users could select to trust or distrust the reviews written by others;
(iii) Slashdot [32]—a technological news web site, which allows users tag others as friends or foes. Basic statistics of these
three real networks are presented in Table 1.
3.2. Comparison with degree centralities
We employ the standard susceptible–infected–removed (SIR) model [33] to estimate the spreading influence of the top-
ranked users. In the SIR model, each node can be in one of the three possible states: susceptible, infected and removed.
Initially, a single node is set to be infected, and at each time step, each infected node will infect all its susceptible neighbors
with probability β and then be removed (dead or recovered with immunity) with probability γ . Without the loss of
generality, we set γ = 1. The dynamical process stops when no infected node is present.
We first compare the spreading processes activated by top-ranked nodes from weighted LeaderRank and the traditional
degree centralities. There are three degree centralities for directed networks: in-degree kin, out-degree kout and total degree
ktot = kin + kout. Taking in-degree as an example. If among the two top-L lists by weighted LeaderRank and in-degree, there
are n different nodes, we compare the spreading processed activated by these n different nodes, respectively. For example,
if L = 4 and for weighted LeaderRank and in-degree, the top-ranked lists are {7, 28, 392, 1146} and {28, 168, 433, 1146},
then n = 2 andwewill compare the spreading processes with initially infected nodes {7, 392} for weighted LeaderRank and
{168, 433} for in-degree, respectively. In the comparison, we fix α = 1 since this value is close to the optimal value for all
three real networks (see later). Notice that, when β is very small, the disease cannot spread out and the comparison is less
meaningful, while when β is very large, almost every individual will get infected, and thus the advantage of our algorithm is
not obvious. Only when β lies in the middle, the comparison is meaningful. In the following simulations, we always set the
values of β as 0.06, 0.015 and 0.015 for Delicious, Epinions and Slashdot, respectively. We have checked that the qualitative
results are not sensitive to β unless β is very large or very small.
Figs. 2–4 respectively report the number of nodes, NI , having been infected (i.e., infected and removed nodes) as a
function of time for Delicious, Epinions and Slashdot. In each figure, we compare theweighted LeaderRankwith three degree
centralities for three typical lengths of top-ranked lists: L = 20, L = 50 and L = 100. Obviously, in each of the 27 reported
cases, the weighted LeaderRank at α = 1 outperforms degree centralities.
3.3. Difference between LeaderRank and weighted LeaderRank
Note that, when α = 0, the weighted LeaderRank degenerates to the original LeaderRank. Considering the top-L
influential nodes respectively produced by LeaderRank and weighted LeaderRank given a specific α, if there are n different
nodes in the two lists,wedefine thedifferenceof such twoalgorithms asn/L. Fig. 5 reports the difference between LeaderRank
and Weighted LeaderRank for three real networks, indicating that the top-L list is sensitive to the parameter α. Generally
speaking, the larger the absolute value of α is, the bigger the difference is.
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Fig. 2. Thenumber of nodes having been infected as a function of time forDelicious. The three columns, from left to right, are respectively for L = 20, L = 50
and L = 100, while the three cows, fromup to down, are respectively for in-degree, out-degree and total degree. The black and red curves denote the results
from weighted LeaderRank and degree centralities, respectively. The parameters are set as α = 1 and β = 0.06, and the results are obtained by averaging
over 100 independent runs. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
3.4. Spreadability
Given the network, the spreadability of a node i, denoted by SPi, is defined as the average number of removed nodes
at the steady state if node i is set to be the only initially infected node. In this paper, the spreadability of a given node is
obtained by averaging over 100 independent runs.
Given the top-ranked lists by the LeaderRank and the weighted LeaderRank with parameter α, if there are n different
nodes, then the average values of spreadability of the n nodes for the weighted LeaderRank and LeaderRank are respectively
denoted by SP(α) and SP(0). Accordingly, we define the relative spreadability as
η = SP(α) − SP(0)
SP(0)
. (3)
Clearly, η > 0 indicates that the weighted LeaderRank performs better than the LeaderRank.
Fig. 6 shows the relative spreadability, which demonstrates that the weighted LeaderRank can considerably improve the
spreadability of top-ranked nodes compared to the original LeaderRank, and the optimal performance is around α = 1 for
the three present cases. Denote s∞i (α) the final score of node i by the weighted LeaderRank with parameter α, then the
change of i’s score from the original LeaderRank reads
Δi = s∞i (α) − s∞i (0). (4)
We quantify the correlation between score changes and spreadabilities by the well-known Kendall’s Tau [34]. For a pair of
nodes i and j, if SPi > SPj and Δi > Δj or SPi < SPj and Δi < Δj, we call this pair is a concordant pair, otherwise it is called
a discordant pair. If the numbers of concordant pair and discordant pair areMcon andMdis, then the Kendall’s Tau is
τ = Mcon − Mdis1
2N(N − 1)
. (5)
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Fig. 3. The number of nodes having been infected as a function of time for Epinions. The three columns, from left to right, are respectively for L = 20, L = 50
and L = 100, while the three cows, fromup to down, are respectively for in-degree, out-degree and total degree. The black and red curves denote the results
fromweighted LeaderRank and degree centralities, respectively. The parameters are set as α = 1 and β = 0.015, and the results are obtained by averaging
over 100 independent runs. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
τ > 0 indicates a positive correlation and τ = 1 is the ideal case where SPi and Δi are completely in the same order. As
shown in Fig. 6(b), (e) and (h), the peaks of Kendall’s Tau are also around α = 1, in accordance with the optimal α for η.
Results with higher resolution, as shown in Fig. 6(c), (f) and (i) show the optimal values are α = 1.1, α = 0.8 and α = 1.1,
respectively.
3.5. Robustness
Real networks are usually noisy and thus many efforts have been made to detect missing links and remove spurious
links [35]. Therefore, a good ranking algorithm should be tolerant to noisy data. Here we randomly add or remove some
links from the original networks to see the change of scores, as
Is =
N∑
i=1
|s˜∞i − s∞i |, (6)
where s˜∞i is the final score of node i after adding or removing a certain number of links. Of course, Is increases as the
increasing of randomly adding or removing links, as shown in Fig. 7. While comparing with the original LeaderRank, the
weighted LeaderRank with α = 1 is more tolerant, as indicated by its smaller Is.
Malicious activities are common in the Internet, in particular in social networks and e-commerce user–product bipartite
networks when users manipulate to gain skewed reputation [36], and thus to design robust ranking algorithms against
spammers attracts increasing attention recently [37]. Here we consider a representative example called sybil attack [38], in
which spammers deliberately create fake entities to obtain disproportionately high rank. Under the Sybil attack, a spamuser
i, with original rank being denoted by ri, creates v fake fans all pointing to i itself. Then i’s new rank is r ′i . Clearly, r
′
i should
be smaller than ri. The smaller difference |r ′i − ri| corresponds to higher robustness.
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Fig. 4. The number of nodes having been infected as a function of time for Slashdot. The three columns, from left to right, are respectively for L = 20, L = 50
and L = 100, while the three cows, fromup to down, are respectively for in-degree, out-degree and total degree. The black and red curves denote the results
fromweighted LeaderRank and degree centralities, respectively. The parameters are set as α = 1 and β = 0.015, and the results are obtained by averaging
over 100 independent runs. (For interpretation of the references to colour in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
a b c
Fig. 5. The fraction of different nodes in top-L (L = 20, 50, 100) list of influential nodes between LeaderRank (α = 0) and weighted LeaderRank.
(a), (b) and (c) display the results for Delicious, Epinions and Slashdot, respectively.
Specifically, each time we consider a spam user who creates v = 20, 50 or 100 fake fans and compare the manipulated
ranks of this user by LeaderRank andweighted LeaderRankwithα = 1. Only the top-100 users (i.e., ri ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 100}) are
under investigation. Fig. 8 reports the simulation results, where the horizontal axis shows the original rank of a user,
and the vertical axis shows her manipulated rank after the addition of v fake fans. As shown in Fig. 8, the weighted
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Fig. 6. Relative spreadability at L = 20, 50 and 100 for (a) Delicious, (d) Epinions, and (g) Slashdot, with parameters being β = 0.06, 0.015 and 0.015, re-
spectively. The correlation between the change of nodes’ scores and their spreadabilities, quantified by the Kendall’s Tau, for (b)(c) Delicious, (e)(f) Epinions,
and (h)(i) Slashdot.
a b c
Fig. 7. The change of scores, Is , as a function of the number of links being randomly added or removed for (a) Delicious, (b) Epinions, and (c) Slashdot. All
data points are average values over 100 independent runs with error bars showing the standard deviations.
LeaderRank with α = 1 is more robust against sybil attack as the change of ranks is much smaller than that associated
with LeaderRank.
4. Conclusion and discussion
LeaderRank may serve as a prototype of ranking algorithms applicable to rank users in social networks. Compared to
PageRank, it can find higher influential spreaders with faster convergence, and is more robust to noise and spammers. In
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Fig. 8. The manipulated rank as obtained by LeaderRank and weighted LeaderRank with α = 1, after the addition of v fake fans (v = 10, 50, 100) for
(a)(d) Delicious, (b)(e) Epinions, and (c)(f) Slashdot.
this paper, we further improve the LeaderRank by allowing nodes with more fans get more scores from the ground node.
With almost the same converging speed (we have checked by simulations), this so-called weighted LeaderRank performs
better than LeaderRank in three aspects: (i) the ability to find out more influential spreaders; (ii) the higher tolerance to
noisy data; and (iii) the higher robustness to intentional attacks.
Since the in-degree of a node (i.e., the number of fans) directly indicates its influence, it is natural to weight nodes
according to their influence as applied in this paper. In contrast, it is strange to weight a node according to how many
nodes it follows (i.e., the number of its leaders, namely its out-degree). In addition, to weight a node by the number of its
leaders is not robust since a node is easy to add as many as leaders. We can also setwgi = 1 andwig = (kini )α . However, it is
also not easy to explain: why a node with more fans needs to give more to the ground node? We have checked that all the
three above-mentioned weighting schemes give worse performance than the present one. Using two or more parameters
in a more complicated form can give a slightly better performance, but it is very ugly and not easy to be understood.
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